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Technological Self-Sufficiency and the
Role of Novelty Traps
Rochelle C. Dreyfuss* and Daniel Benoliel**
ABSTRACT
The COVID pandemic has demonstrated the tragic consequences
of technological dependency. Unable to manufacture vaccines for
themselves, developing countries must rely on obtaining supplies from
other nations. While strong arguments have been made to waive
international obligations under the TRIPS Agreement to permit these
countries to freely use COVID-related patented inventions, it is not clear
that this move would produce sufficient vaccines to meet global demand.
Considerable scholarship has been devoted to the question of how to help
these countries reach the technological frontier and become
technologically independent. In this Article, we identify a novel source of
their problem: a structural feature of modern patent law traps
technologies in a legal limbo, where there are inadequate incentives to
invest in the adaptations and efforts needed to make technologies
effectively available in low-income countries. Moreover, the current
regime deprives potential innovators of an opportunity to protect their
intellectual contributions and begin to build robust innovative
ecosystems. The Article proposes a modified patent regime designed to
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break what we call the “novelty trap” and discusses its compatibility
with international intellectual property law.
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I. INTRODUCTION

If there is one thing that the COVID pandemic has taught us, it
is the value of technological self-sufficiency. Technologically
sophisticated countries are pulling themselves out of the coronavirus
crisis.1 They do so by developing, manufacturing, and distributing the
inventions needed to test people for SARS-CoV-2, including its variants,
and to trace, cure, and immunize the local population.2 Nations that
lack the appropriate resources are not faring as well.3 In India, for
1.
See, e.g., Covid-19: The Global Crisis — in Data, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 18, 2020),
https://ig.ft.com/coronavirus-global-data/ [https://perma.cc/4FUM-QFTZ] [hereinafter Covid-19:
The Global Crisis].
2.
See, e.g., Shawn Radcliffe, Here’s Exactly Where We Are with Vaccines and Treatments
for COVID-19, HEALTHLINE (Jan. 25, 2022), https://www.healthline.com/health-news/heres-exactly-where-were-at-with-vaccines-and-treatments-for-covid-19 [https://perma.cc/XYQ3-5VBT].
3.
Covid-19: The Global Crisis, supra note 1.
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example, the disease raged on long after developed countries had
stockpiled the materials needed for treatment and had immunized a
significant portion of their residents.4 Blaming their fate partly on a
global intellectual property regime that blocks access to supplies
at prices they can afford, low-income countries demanded that the
World Trade Organization (WTO) waive their obligations under the
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS Agreement) to protect patents and trade secrets.5 Waiving their
obligations, the low-income countries claimed, would allow them to
suspend their patent laws, manufacture the products they need to deal
with the pandemic, and make those products available at cost or prices
that do not include the payment of royalties to right holders.6 Although
many countries joined in this initiative,7 it was never clear that a waiver
would constitute an effective response. As the Max Planck Institute
argued, shortages in supplies were largely caused by the insufficiency
of worldwide production capacity.8 That problem, the Institute
suggested, did not stem from patents or other forms of intellectual
property protection but rather from the paucity of manufacturing
know-how and technical infrastructure in many low-income countries.9
There is, however, a way in which intellectual property law was
a core obstacle to universal delivery of the material needed to contain
the coronavirus. As currently structured, the international intellectual

4.
Jeffrey Gettlemean & Suhasini Raj, Covid Desperation Is Spreading Across India,
N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/11/world/asia/covid-india-ganges-oxygen.html
[https://perma.cc/LF4U-JQW5] (May 13, 2021).
5.
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 31, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869
U.N.T.S. 299, 313 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS]; Communication from India and South Africa,
Waiver from Certain Provisions of the TRIPS Agreement for the Prevention, Containment,
and
Treatment
of
COVID-19,
WTO
Doc.
IP/C/W/669
(Oct.
2,
2020),
https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc.aspx?filename=q:/IP/C/W669.pdf&Open=True
[https://perma.cc/EB45-FTTV] (asking, in the face of a “global emergency” for “a waiver from the
implementation, application and enforcement of Sections 1, 4, 5, and 7 of Part II of the TRIPS
Agreement”, paras. 3, 12) [hereinafter Communication].
6.
Communication, supra note 5.
7.
See, e.g., Statement from Ambassador Katherine Tai on the Covid-19 TRIPS Waiver,
U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE (May 5, 2021), https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2021/may/statement-ambassador-katherine-tai-covid-19-trips-waiver
[https://perma.cc/S9RT-28XA].
8.
Reto M. Hilty, Pedro Henrique D. Batista, Suelen Carls, Daria Kim, Matthias
Lamping & Peter R. Slowinski, Max Planck Inst. for Innovation & Competition, Covid-19 and the
Role of Intellectual Property: Position Statement of the Max Planck Institute for Innovation and
Competition of 7 May 2021 at 2 (Max Planck Inst. for Innovation & Competition, Research
Paper
No.
21-13,
2021),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3841549
[https://perma.cc/SD6F-4WEQ] (click “Open PDF in Browser”).
9.
Id.
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property system makes it difficult for countries to acquire the
capabilities necessary to develop modern technologies, to adapt them to
local conditions, or even to simply manufacture and disseminate them.10
In this Article, we identify for the first time an important source of that
problem: the emergence of an absolute standard of novelty.11 Under this
standard, no country will award a utility patent to an invention that
was disclosed in, or rendered obvious by, prior art available anywhere
in the world—that is, if the elements of the invention were published,
patented, or even simply practiced in any place, regardless of its local
accessibility.12 As we explain, that standard traps technologies that
could improve social welfare in a no man’s land where there are
inadequate incentives to do the work needed to make, distribute, and
use them.13 Hence our label: the novelty trap.14
For developed countries in the North, this high standard of
novelty largely makes sense. As long as the people working in a field
have the absorptive capacity to learn from publicly disclosed materials,
one can assume that they will identify promising technologies, make
any incremental changes needed to promote their domestic use, and
develop distribution networks.15 Moreover, it is likely that customers
in these countries will be receptive to—indeed, eager for—advanced
technologies, have the funds to buy them, and possess the
complementary assets, such as electricity and refrigeration, needed to
adopt them.16 Thus, one can also assume that customer demand will
provide an impetus to innovate.17 Although incentives to commercialize
10.
For a collection of essays on this impact of exclusive rights, see INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC CHALLENGES FOR DEVELOPMENT 5 (Mario Cimoli,
Giovanni Dosi, Keith E. Maskus, Ruth L. Okediji, Jerome H. Reichman & Joseph E. Stiglitz eds.,
2014); see also DANIEL BENOLIEL, PATENT INTENSITY AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 36–38 (2017)
(discussing the challenge of capacity building in developing countries).
11.
See World Intell. Prop. Org. [WIPO], Information Provided by the Members of the
Standing Committee on the Law of Patents (SCP) Concerning the Definition of Prior Art Brief
Summary, ¶ 6, WIPO Doc. SCP/6/INF/2 (Nov. 2, 2001) (reviewing the prior art policies of
forty-nine countries; noting that in a large majority, disclosure anywhere in the world is sufficient
to constitute prior art).
12.
See infra text accompanying notes 75–79.
13.
See infra text accompanying notes 86–90.
14.
Empirical evidence on the impact of the novelty trap will be presented in another
paper. See Daniel Benoliel & Michael Gishboliner, Novelty Traps, Kiwis, and Other Flightless
Birds, 2020 MICH. ST. L. REV. (forthcoming 2022), https://law.haifa.ac.il/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/Novelty-Traps-law-rev.pdf [https://perma.cc/87QZ-64TV].
15.
Shaker A. Zahra & Gerard George, Absorptive Capacity: A Review,
Reconceptualization, and Extension, 27 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 185, 196–97 (2002).
16.
See, e.g., Nir Kshetri, Barriers to E-Commerce and Competitive Business Models in
Developing Countries: A Case Study, 6 ELEC. COM. RSCH. & APPLICATION 443, 444 (2007).
17.
Cf. Stanley L. Engerman & Kenneth L. Sokoloff, Factor Endowment, Institutions, and
Differential Paths of Growth Among New World Economies: A View from Economic
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may sometimes be desirable,18 patent law generally focuses on inducing
inventions that would not be created otherwise through the skills of
ordinary industrialists and artisans in the field, subject to conventional
market forces.19
For developing countries in the Global South, however, these
assumptions do not always hold. “State-of-the-art” patentable
inventions, of the type prevalent in Northern countries, are often
beyond the reach of local technologists.20 While indigenous inventors
may be in a position to make “low-end” advances (“good enough”
technologies by the poor, for the poor,21 such as appliances that work
without a steady supply of electricity) truly effective use of foreign
technology would take considerable effort.22 What might be called
“midlevel inventiveness” can be needed for diffusion—to build factories
capable of manufacturing high-tech products, adapt inventions made in
developed countries to local conditions, supply complementary assets,

Historians of the United States, in MODERN POLITICAL ECONOMY AND LATIN AMERICA: THEORY
AND POLICY 122 (Jeffrey Frieden, Manuel Pastor Jr. & Michael Tomz eds., 2000) (noting how the
US middle class’s demand for standardized goods affected inventive activity and technological
change).
18.
See, e.g., Ted Sichelman, Commercializing Patents, 62 STAN. L. REV. 341, 388–89
(2010).
19.
KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 402–03 (2007); Michael Abramowicz &
John Duffy, The Inducement Standard of Patentability, 120 YALE L.J. 1590, 1601–02 (2015).
20.
Xiaolan Fu & Jing Zhang, Technology Transfer, Indigenous Innovation and
Leapfrogging in Green Technology: Solar-PV Panel Industries in India and China, 9 J. CHINESE
ECON. & BUS. STUD. 329, 332–33 (2011).
21.
See Richard Heeks, Christopher Foster & Yanuar Nugroho, New Models of Inclusive
Innovation for Development, 42 J. INNOVATION & DEV. 175 (2014) (discussing inclusive
innovation
as
a
policy
lever
for
development);
Beijing
Forum
Promotes
Inclusive Innovation for Sustainable Growth, THE WORLD BANK (June 21, 2012),
https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2012/06/21/beijing-forum-promotes-inclusive-innovation-for-sustainable-growth
[https://perma.cc/QR32-3NKH]
(discussing
the
spread
of
inclusive
innovation
in
emerging
markets);
JULIO
A.
BERDEGUÉ,
INT’L
FUND FOR AGRIC. DEV., PRO-POOR INNOVATION SYSTEMS 1–11
(2005),
http://www.lamolina.edu.pe/postgrado/pmdas/cursos/innovacion/lecturas/Obligatoria/3%20-%20Berdegue%202005.pdf [https://perma.cc/H5LF-ARAG] (discussing inclusive innovation in agriculture in
developing countries).
22.
For the definition of diffusion as used by innovation theorists, see, e.g., Bronwyn Hall,
Innovation and Diffusion, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INNOVATION 459–60 (Jan
Fagerberg, David C. Mowery & Richard R. Nelson eds., 2006) [hereinafter INNOVATION
HANDBOOK] (“[T]he word diffusion is commonly used to describe the process by which individuals
and firms in a society/economy adopt a new technology, or replace an older technology with a newer
. . . it is also an intrinsic part of the innovation process, as learning, imitation, and feedback effects
which arise during the spread of a new technology enhance the original innovation.”).

446

VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.

[Vol. 24:3:441

educate and train the domestic market, and create systems to distribute
products and build demand.23
Unfortunately, it is precisely the type of advances necessary that
are most likely caught by the novelty trap: because the basic
technologies are already known, the incremental changes inventors
would wish to make are not always patentable. Yet without adequate
incentives to diffuse Northern technology, the activity necessary to do
so will be inefficient, if not entirely absent. If that is the case, the social
welfare gains associated with the use of foreign technology will not
be realized. Moreover, without an incentive system geared to
local inventive capacities, the ecosystem required to support
entrepreneurship and risk-taking, human capital formation, as well as
capital accumulation and investment, is likely to be inadequate. The
result is that developing countries will tend to remain technologically
dependent on developed ones, and the likelihood is that inventions of
importance to the South will not be adapted or produced. Examples
include COVID vaccines, which may be scarce and, as formulated for
the North, can be difficult for nations in the South to make, store, and
transport;24 plants that grow in the arid environments characteristic of
many low-income countries;25 and agricultural technologies, such as
harvesters, adapted to local conditions.26
There are many actions a country that is behind the
technological frontier might take to become technologically
self-sufficient—a term that we use to encompass acquiring the capacity
to absorb foreign technologies, produce these advances, and make
effective use of them, with the objective of reaching the point where the
country is inventing at the global knowledge frontier, at least in sectors

23.
See World Bank Group [WBG], Global Economic Prospects: Technology
Diffusion in the Developing World, at xi, WBG Doc. 42097 (2008), https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/827331468323971985/pdf/42097optmzd0REVISED0GEP020081PUBLIC1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9P9J-YGSN] [hereinafter 2008 World Bank Report].
24.
Joselyn Kaiser, Temperature Concerns Could Slow the Rollout of New Coronavirus
Vaccines, SCI. (Nov. 16, 2020), https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2020/11/temperature-concernscould-slow-rollout-new-coronavirus-vaccines [https://perma.cc/DWR4-FZY3].
25.
See, e.g., Ronald Herring, Stealth Seeds: Bioproperty, Biosafety, Biopolitics, 43 J. DEV.
STUD. 130, 131 (2007) [hereinafter Stealth Seeds].
26.
Cf. Gregory Graff & David Zilberman, How the IP-Regulatory Complex Affects
Incentives to Develop Socially Beneficial Products from Agricultural Genomics, in INNOVATION IN
AGRICULTURAL GENOMICS 68 (Emily Marden, R. Nelson Godfrey & Rachael Manion eds., 2016)
(discussing the dearth of drought-tolerant genetic technology); GOV’T OF PUNJAB, HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT REPORT 171 (2004) [hereinafter PUNJAB DEVELOPMENT REPORT] (describing the
steps taken to achieve a “Green Revolution”).
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of local priority.27 We see as one key to that endeavor the
introduction of a second-tier regime of patent protection. A
second-tier regime would be designed to break the novelty trap and
release innovative opportunities for local inventors. In essence, we
recommend that developing countries create, as a supplement to utility
patents, a new and distinctive intellectual property right, which we
term “diffusion patents.” These rights would be loosely analogous to
pre-TRIPS patents of importation and would incentivize the efforts
necessary for a country to reach technological self-sufficiency.28 To that
end, we recommend three changes to the novelty, inventive step, and
disclosure requirements of patent law.29 First, and most important, we
would define the landscape against which the novelty and
inventiveness of a technology is determined to exclude art that is not
patented (or perhaps simply not worked) locally. Second, we would
modify the inventive-step inquiry by focusing on the skills of the
ordinary local artisan. Third, we suggest adapting the disclosure
requirements of patent law to respond to the capacities of domestic
inventors. In addition, we consider various implementation issues,
including narrowing the scope of protection, restricting the availability
of the regime to inventors from low-income countries, and imposing
price controls.30
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II elaborates on the
reasons that diffusion patents would mitigate technological
dependency. Part III describes the novelty trap in greater depth and
discusses the details and advantages of a diffusion patent regime. Part
IV considers justifications, both empirical and theoretical, for the moves
we suggest. Finally, Part V discusses the consistency of this approach
with international intellectual property law.

27.
See, e.g., Jan Fagerberg & Manuel M. Godinho, Innovation and Catching-Up, in
INNOVATION HANDBOOK, supra note 22, at 514; KEUN LEE, SCHUMPETERIAN ANALYSIS OF
ECONOMIC CATCH-UP: KNOWLEDGE, PATH-CREATION AND THE MIDDLE-INCOME TRAP 6 (2013).
28.
See J.H. Reichman, Legal Hybrids Between the Patent and Copyright Paradigms, 94
COLUM. L. REV. 2432, 2449 (1994).
29.
See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–103, 112.
30.
As the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has demonstrated, the pandemic
revealed that alongside low-income countries, many middle-income countries also suffer from
technological inequality. See IMF, A Fair Shot, Fiscal Monitor 28, 31 (Apr. 2021),
https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/FM/Issues/2021/03/29/fiscal-monitor-april-2021
[https://perma.cc/MA46-46UV] (Click “Full Report”). Thus, although we focus our proposal on
low-income countries, we acknowledge that it could be applied, at least partly, to middle-income
countries.
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II. TECHNOLOGICAL DEPENDENCY
Although there are many reasons for growing global inequality
in the technological sphere, an important factor stems from the decision
to link intellectual property with trade and to incorporate obligations to
protect intellectual property into the WTO regime.31 To a considerable
extent, the TRIPS Agreement’s one-size-fits-all regime was intended to
benefit the high-income, developed countries of the North.32
The thinking was that commodification of intellectual property rights
would facilitate global trade in information.33 Furthermore, without
WTO-wide
commitments
to
protect
intellectual
property,
opening Northern markets to goods produced cheaply in
low-wage countries in the South would leave Northern inventors
without a return on the knowledge inputs embedded in manufactured
products.34 That said, proponents of the TRIPS Agreement also made
strong arguments that TRIPS would likewise help the South.35 The
Washington Consensus suggested that rigorous intellectual property
protection would encourage foreign direct investment (FDI) and
technology transfer, promote a local innovation culture, and enable the
South to catch up and progress to the technological frontier.36
31.
See, e.g., Peter K. Yu, The Objectives and Principles of the TRIPS Agreement, 46 HOUS.
L. REV. 979, 984–85 (2009); Anselm Kamperman Sanders, Intellectual Property, Free Trade
Agreements and Economic Development, 23 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 893, 894 (2007); Rochelle Cooper
Dreyfuss & Diane L. Zimmerman, The Culture and Economics of Participation in an
International Intellectual Property Regime, 29 J. INT’L L. & POL. 1, 3 (1996-1997). See generally
Antony Taubman, Thematic Review: Negotiating “Trade-Related Aspects” of Intellectual Property
Rights, in THE MAKING OF THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: PERSONAL INSIGHTS FROM THE
URUGUAY ROUND NEGOTIATIONS 15 (Jayashree Watal & Antony Taubman eds., 2015),
https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/trips_agree_e/history_of_trips_nego_e.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Y4MF-URS2] (discussing how TRIPS “reframed both the international
governance of IP and the very concept of ‘trade’ within multilateral trade law and policy.”); Peter
Drahos, Thinking Strategically About Intellectual Property Rights, 21 TELECOMM. POL’Y, 201
(1997) (discussing the globalization of intellectual property standards resulting from TRIPS).
32.
See, e.g., Sanders, supra note 31.
33.
See, e.g., David W. Leebron, An Overview of the Uruguay Round Results, 34 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 11, 28–29 (1995).
34.
See, e.g., Harvey E. Bale, Jr., Patent Protection and Pharmaceutical Innovation, 29
N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 95, 95, 99, 101 (1996). Sometimes, technological advances are
embedded in processes; in this piece, we generally use products to encompass both products and
processes.
35.
See, e.g., id. at 101.
36.
Douglas A. Irwin & Oliver War, What is the “Washington Consensus?”, PETERSON
INST. FOR INT’L ECON. (Sept. 8, 2021, 12:30 PM), https://www.piie.com/blogs/realtime-economic-issues-watch/what-washington-consensus
[https://perma.cc/9TX2-B6SG].
The
Washington
Consensus describes a set of policy reforms originally aimed at improving welfare in developing
countries. See John Williamson, The Strange History of the Washington Consensus, 27 J. POST
KEYNESIAN ECON. 195, 196 (2004–2005).
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Furthermore, the intellectual property obligations required by the WTO
would provide Southern legislators with political cover and allow them
to escape short-term concerns about higher prices; in the long term,
developing countries would achieve the social welfare gains associated
with scientific advancement.37
More than twenty-five years have elapsed since the TRIPS
Agreement came into effect, and the North does appear to have
benefited from stronger protection.38 However, it is also evident that the
South has suffered.39 The projected benefits to the Global South have
not materialized.40 World markets for the commodities sold in the South
did not compensate for the higher costs associated with intellectual
property-protected goods.41 Nor did high levels of intellectual property
protection induce significant FDI or give rise to world-class indigenous
inventorship.42 Instead, technological dependency has persisted, the
technological divide endures, and, as evidenced by the uneven
distribution of COVID-19 vaccines, TRIPS is contributing to increasing
global inequality.43 For example, Keith Maskus and Lei Yang have
found that although the changes TRIPS required have improved
performance in research-intensive industries, the impact is smaller in
lower-income economies, with minimal increases in indigenous
innovation.44 Similarly, the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD) has expressed concerns about a widening

37.
J.H. Reichman, The TRIPS Agreement Comes of Age: Conflict or Cooperation with the
Developing Countries?, 32 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 441, 450, 459, 469 (2000).
38.
Suma Athreye, Lucia Pisciello & Kenneth C. Shadlen, Twenty-Five Years Since
TRIPS: Patent Policy and International Business, 3 J. INT’L BUS. POL’Y 315, 318 (2020).
39.
See generally James Thuo Gathii, Strength in Intellectual Property Protection and
Foreign Direct Investment Flows in Least Developed Countries, 44 GA. J. INT’L & COMPAR. L. 499
(2016) (discussing the high costs to implement intellectual property regimes in Least Developed
Countries).
40.
See, e.g., JOSEPH STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 29–30 (2003).
41.
Id. at 29.
42.
The strength of the patent system does not appear to be related to investment
decisions. See Nagesh Kumar, Determinants of Location of Overseas R and D Activity of
Multinational Enterprises: The Case of US and Japanese Corporations, 30 RSCH. POL’Y 159, 166
(2001).
43.
See World Social Report: Inequality in a Rapidly Changing World, UNITED
NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS 57–80 (2020), https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2020/02/World-Social-Report2020-FullReport.pdf
[https://perma.cc/734T-7PKP].
44.
Keith E. Maskus & Lei Yang, Domestic Patent Rights, Access to Technologies, and the
Structure of Exports, 51 CAN. J. ECON. 483, 489 (2018).
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technological gap and associated it with increased inequality across a
variety of dimensions.45
As it turns out, reaching technological self-sufficiency is a far
more complex task than acknowledged by the Washington Consensus.46
Indeed, extensive literature has grown up around questions concerning
the conditions and mechanisms that would improve the innovative
environment in the South and equalize its access to modern
technologies.47 As we explain in more detail below,48 among other
things, commentators suggest that catching up to the global knowledge
frontier requires skilled workers, firms, and customers, as well as an
infrastructure capable of supporting research, development, and
distribution.49
These insights have led intellectual property scholars to focus on
creating job opportunities that enable workers to “learn by
doing”—to develop technological capabilities by using imported
high-tech equipment and processes, and facilitating access to such
materials.50 In accordance with that view, efforts have been made to
ensure that international intellectual property laws give
countries the flexibility to require patent holders to “work” their
inventions—manufacture patented products or use patented
processes—locally.51 At the same time, a strong emphasis has been
45.
U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, Technology and Innovation Report 2021,
at
15
(2021),
https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/tir2020overview_en.pdf
[https://perma.cc/M7KT-WZZ2].
46
46.
Narcis Serra, Shari Spiegel & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Introduction: From the
Washington Consensus Towards a New Global Governance, in THE WASHINGTON CONSENSUS
RECONSIDERED: TOWARDS A NEW GLOBAL GOVERNANCE (Narcis Serra & Joseph E. Stiglitz eds.,
2008).
47.
See, e.g., ALEXANDER GERSCHENKRON, ECONOMIC BACKWARDNESS IN HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE 127 (1962); LEE, supra note 27, at 5; Fagerberg & Godinho, supra note 27; Moses
Abramovitz, Catching Up, Forging Ahead, and Falling Behind, 46 J. ECON. HIST. 385, 390 (1986);
J.H. Reichman, Universal Minimum Standards of Intellectual Property Protection Under the
TRIPS Component of the WTO Agreement, 29 INT’L LAW. 345, 373 (1995); J.H. Reichman & David
Lange, Bargaining Around the TRIPS Agreement: The Case for Ongoing Public-Private Initiatives
to Facilitate Worldwide Intellectual Property Transactions, 9 DUKE J. COMPAR. & INT’L L. 11, 29
(1998).
48.
See infra text accompanying notes 178–236.
49.
Fagerberg & Godinho, supra note 27, at 536.
50.
See, e.g., Carlos M. Correa, Public Health and Patent Legislation in Developing
Countries, 3 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1, 50 (2001); Reichman & Lange, supra note 47, at 50–
51.
51.
Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property art. 5A(4), Mar. 20, 1883,
21 U.S.T. 1629, 828 U.N.T.S. 305; see, e.g., MAX PLANCK INST. FOR INNOVATION & COMPETITION,
DECLARATION ON PATENT PROTECTION: REGULATORY SOVEREIGNTY UNDER TRIPS 9 (2014),
https://www.mpg.de/8132986/Patent-Declaration.pdf [https://perma.cc/NA4C-BK56]; Farida Shaheed (Special Rapporteur in the Field of Cultural Rights), Rep. of the Special Rapporteur in the
Field of Cultural Rights, U.N. DOC. A/70/279 (Aug. 4, 2015); GRAEME B. DINWOODIE & ROCHELLE
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placed on relaxing intellectual property obligations so that patented
inventions are available in the South at reasonable prices.52 The
proposed COVID waiver stems from that view, and the one modification
that has been made to the TRIPS Agreement—the addition of another
provision on compulsory licensing—reflects a similar approach.53 Like
the waiver, it reduces the degree of exclusivity rights holders enjoy in
order to promote access—in the case of the modification, by allowing
one WTO country to produce pharmaceuticals for the benefit of a WTO
member that lacks manufacturing capacity.54
The scholarship of innovation economists suggests, however,
that these steps are not nearly enough—workers who learn by doing
become adept at imitation.55 In the short term, countries can improve
social welfare using that approach because their firms can exploit wage
differences with higher-income countries and profit from selling cheap
versions of advanced products on global markets.56 But there is a limit
to this strategy: over time, the workers with imitative skills demand
higher pay, and countries with even lower wage scales develop the skills
to compete in the same sectors.57 Reducing the cost of high-tech
materials through compulsory licensing or other mechanisms is often
also ineffective because both private and commercial consumers may
need sufficient knowledge capital to understand what technologies are
available. Similarly, they may need that capacity to evaluate these
technologies, implement them, and adapt them to local conditions and
social practices.58 Adaptation can also require fresh investments.

C. DREYFUSS, A NEOFEDERALIST VISION OF TRIPS: THE RESILIENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME 57, 116 (2012); Rochelle Dreyfuss & Susy Frankel, From
Incentive to Commodity to Asset: How International Law Is Reconceptualizing Intellectual
Property, 36 MICH. J. INT’L L. 557, 563 (2015) (discussing the local working requirements in Paris
Convention article 4 and its incorporation into the TRIPS Agreement).
52.
See, e.g., Carlos M. Correa, Intellectual Property Rights and the Use of Compulsory
Licenses: Options for Developing Countries 1 (S. Ctr. Working Paper No. 5, 1999),
https://www.iatp.org/sites/default/files/Intellectual_Property_Rights_and_the_Use_of_Co.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TZH9-DT8J].
53.
TRIPS, supra note 5, art. 31bis.
54.
Whether the modification provides enough access is, of course, another question, see
Nicholas G. Vincent, TRIP-ing Up: The Failure of TRIPS Article 31bis, 24 GONZ. J. INT’L L. 1, 8
(2020). The pandemic suggests it is not.
55.
Boyan Jovanovic &Yaw Nyarko, Learning by Doing and the Choice of Technology, 64
ECONOMETRICA 1299, 1299 (1996).
56.
See, e.g., Linsu Kim & Richard. R. Nelson, Introduction, in TECHNOLOGY, LEARNING
& INNOVATION: EXPERIENCE OF NEWLY INDUSTRIALIZING ECONOMIES 4 (Linsu Kim & Richard R.
Nelson eds., 2000).
57.
LEE, supra note 27, at 5.
58.
Abramovitz, supra note 47; Hall, supra note 22, at 469 (“[The] factors that might be
expected to influence the diffusion of innovations . . . can be classified into four main groups, those
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Zvi Griliches, notably, studied the speed at which hybrid corn diffused
across the Midwest of the United States.59 He found that the rate of
diffusion depended on how fast suppliers could customize the seed for
use in a particular geographic area.60 Similarly, Kristine Bruland
demonstrated that the development of the Norwegian textile industry
turned on the training that British machinery suppliers provided.61 Put
differently, reducing the profits available from information-based
products works at cross purposes with the objective of promoting
investments in diffusion because lowering available returns makes it
difficult to recoup the extra costs associated with activities such as
customization and training.
A domestic cohort of midlevel inventors and entrepreneurs could
help resolve both the inadequacy of the imitation model and
knowledge-capital inefficiencies. Countries that are behind the
technological frontier have employed a variety of strategies to support
the activities needed to promote the development of local inventiveness.
Some have relied on government subsidies, direction, and involvement
(examples include Japan’s Ministry for Trade and Industry (MITI),
Korea’s Industrial Technology Research Institute (ITRI), and China’s
state-owned enterprises); some have benefited from investments by
family- or business-based cartels (Japan’s zaibatsus and keiretsus;
Korea’s chaebols).62 There are also examples of firms in low-income
countries entering into co-development deals or other arrangements
with foreign firms that enhance local technological capacity.63
Significantly, in a comprehensive study of the countries that
have successfully caught up technologically, Keun Lee notes that many
countries have found it effective to “detour” into a supplementary
regime of patent-like protection.64 In addition to offering utility patents,
these countries have a petit (or second-tier) patent system with
standards that reflect local technological capacities and domestic
priorities.65 Once the catching-up phase is over, Lee suggests that this

that affect the benefits received, those that affect the costs of adoption, those related to the
industry or social environment, and those due to uncertainty and information problems.”).
59.
See Zvi Griliches, Hybrid Corn: An Exploration in the Economics of Technological
Change, 25 ECONOMETRICA 501, 501–03 (1957).
60.
Id. at 516.
61.
Kristine Bruland, Skills, Learning and the International Diffusion of Technology, in
TECHNOLOGICAL REVOLUTIONS IN EUROPE 173–75 (Maxine Berg and Kristine Bruland eds., 1998).
62.
Fagerberg & Godinho, supra note 27, at 5, 18–19.
63.
LEE, supra note 27, at 163–68.
64.
Id.
65.
Id. at 149.
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detour process (and others that he offers) can be eliminated, leaving
only the utility patent regime found in the North.66
It is not difficult to understand why such a detour strategy would
be fruitful. Most obviously, it has the potential to create a mechanism
for incentivizing the incremental innovation required to distribute
technologies that improve social welfare.67 And like intellectual
property systems more generally, it avoids the hazards associated with
depending on government selection processes and support.68 Just as
important, a second-tier patent regime possibly establishes a lower,
easier-to-reach rung on the protective regime ladder. Thus, it enables
people who are behind the technological frontier to enter the system
while adapting foreign technology to local needs. That, in
turn, arguably promotes entrepreneurship, risk-taking, and the
accumulation of human capital. With the right choice of technological
sectors, these inventors can eventually develop the capacity to innovate
at world levels, acquire utility patents in foreign jurisdictions, and even
leapfrog over existing technologies to compete successfully in global
markets.69 At a minimum, this strategy can help a country become
technologically self-sufficient in critical areas, such as healthcare.
Lee does not, however, describe what a lower-tier patent regime
should look like and how it should differ from the regimes common in
the North.70 He leaves that to lawyers.71 Accordingly, it is to this task
that we turn. One aspect is clear: to the extent that the goal of a
lower-tier regime is to create incentives for midlevel inventors, the
inventive step should be adjusted downward to recognize the types of
incremental innovation that they have the potential to accomplish.72
But lowering the step does not supply a complete specification of the
regime. Protection also requires a determination of novelty, and that
analysis entails a comparison between an advance and what is already
known. Thus, the determination requires countries to take a position
on what is considered knowable and what people in the field can glean
from prior art.
There are many ways in which this landscape of prior art could
be characterized, and for a very long time, there were marked
66.
Id. at 22.
67.
See Benoliel & Gishboliner, supra note 14, for empirical findings showing the effect of
IP in incentivizing technology diffusion.
68.
Steven Shavell & Tanguy van Ypersele, Rewards Versus Intellectual Property Rights,
44 J. L. & ECON. 525, 534–44 (2001).
69.
LEE, supra note 27, at 174–77.
70.
See id. at 127–222.
71.
See id.
72.
See discussion, infra Section III.A.2.
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differences in how countries approached that question. For example,
fifteenth-century Venetians considered the landscape to include only
inventions available in Venice; anything new brought to the city could
be patented.73 Until 1952, the United States included patents and
publications from anywhere in the world, but inventions not codified in
one of those ways were considered to be prior art only if they were
practiced locally.74 Similarly, there were differences in whether patent
applications should constitute prior art, and whether elements inherent
in a disclosure, but which were not specifically mentioned, were in the
prior art.75
However, in an effort at the turn of the last century
to negotiate a substantive patent law treaty to bring greater
harmonization to national laws, the World Intellectual Property
Organization (WIPO) suggested the adoption of an absolute standard of
novelty.76 Under this approach, any invention published, patented,
known, used, or sold anywhere in the world would be considered in the
prior art.77 WIPO’s International Bureau justified the standard this
way:
“It is a fundamental objective of the patent system that nothing be alienated from
society which already belongs to it. Indeed, granting a patent on an invention already known would impose constraints on society in respect of the use of known
information without offering any return or benefit.”78

Although WIPO’s substantive patent law treaty initiative was
never promulgated, the last two decades have witnessed a growing
consensus on its view that the optimum standard is one of absolute
novelty. Thus, multiple countries—including the United States—have
largely adopted this approach.79 But in the evolution of that rule, we
73.
STEPHEN LANDES, PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND RELATED RIGHTS: NATIONAL AND
INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION 6–7 (1975) (discussing the Venetian Patent Act of 1474).
74.
35 U.S.C. § 102(a)–(b) (considering as within the prior art inventions “known or used
by others in this country” before invention by the applicant and “in public use or on sale in this
country” more than a year prior to the filing of the patent application).
75.
See generally World Intell. Prop. Org. [WIPO], “Enlarged” Concept of
Novelty: Initial Study Concerning Novelty and the Prior Art Effect of Certain
Applications Under Draft Article 8(2) of the SPLT (2004), https://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/scp/en/novelty/documents/5prov.pdf [https://perma.cc/72U2-XSGT] [hereinafter
WIPO Novelty Study] (studying the prior art effect of unpublished earlier applications under
Article 8(2) of the draft Substantive Patent Law Treaty (SPLT)).
76.
Rochelle Dreyfuss & Jerome Reichman, WIPO’s Role in Procedural and Substantive
Patent Law Harmonization, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
ORGANIZATION: THE FIRST 50 YEARS AND BEYOND 108, 120–21, 127 (Sam Ricketson ed., 2020).
77.
WIPO Novelty Study, supra note 75, at 4–10.
78.
Id. at 4.
79.
See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 102; Patent Act 2013, s 8 (N.Z.); Zhonghua Renming Gongheguo
Zhuanli Fa (中华人民共和国专利法) [Patent Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated
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believe that an important cost was overlooked: this standard creates a
novelty trap. We describe the novelty trap and the problems it creates
in the following sections as part of our discussion of how we would
structure a lower-tier patent regime.
III. THE NOVELTY TRAP, SOCIAL COSTS, AND DIFFUSION PATENTS
The previous sections suggested that technological dependency
stems in part from a global patent system that fails to reflect the
needs of the Global South and the potential for midlevel
inventorship that characterizes its creative communities.80 Introducing
a second-tier patent regime would alleviate the problem and create an
ecosystem supportive of local innovation.81 The question, then, is how
that regime should be structured. In our view, it is important to
recognize that this regime must do more than simply lower the height
of the utility regime’s inventive step, although it must do that as well.
Rather, it is crucial to understand that the international patent system
has evolved to a point where developed countries can shower their
inventions on the developing world and leave valuable technologies
trapped by a legal framework that prevents anyone from undertaking
the efforts needed to distribute, adapt, and improve upon them.
This phenomenon possibly applies also when an inventor in the
North obtains a utility patent on its invention in the South but does not
choose to engage in efforts to exploit it locally. As the Patent
Cooperation Treaty (PCT) has made remote patenting easier, the
problem of Northern patents obstructing exploitation efforts in the
South is becoming more commonplace.82 As a result, the South might

by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 27, 2008, effective Oct. 1, 2009) art. 22, 2008
China Law LEXIS 7207 [hereinafter PRC Patent Law].
80.
See supra Part II.
81.
See supra Part II.
82.
See generally Patent Cooperation Treaty, June 19, 1970, 28 U.S.T. 7645, 1160 U.N.T.S.
231 [hereinafter PCT] (updating and streamlining the international patent process). According to
WIPO, patents granted using a PCT application by non-residents in low-income countries have
gone from 1 in 1985 to 649 in 2019. See WIPO IP Portal, IP Statistics Data
Center,
https://www3.wipo.int/ipstats/index.htm?tab=patent
[https://perma.cc/83L7-TGLD]
(choose “2b- Grant for PCT national phase entries” from the “Indicator” dropdown; choose “Total
count by filing office” from the “Report type” dropdown; choose “1985” and “2020” from the Year
range dropdowns; then select “Low-income” from the “Office” list and click “Add”; then select
“Non-resident from the “Type” list and click “Add”; then click “Search”). In the next tier up (low
middle-income), the numbers are 26 and 31,817. Id. (choose “2b- Grant for PCT national phase
entries” from the “Indicator” dropdown; choose “Total count by filing office” from the “Report type”
dropdown; choose “1985” and “2020” from the Year range dropdowns; then select “Lower
middle-income” from the “Office” list and click “Add”; then select “Non-resident from the “Type”
list and click “Add”; then click “Search”).
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be left with an array of inventions that are not suitable for local use. To
be sure, there may be cases where the utility patent holder tries to
exploit its inventions in the South. However, these efforts can easily
fail. As students of innovation have shown, successful exploitation can
require a local presence:83 Feedback loops that lead to incremental
changes based on user experience; networks and other social systems
which help spread information, including know-how, among the users
of technology and their customers.84 Establishing a local presence can
be difficult, and many foreign inventors do not try.85 Nevertheless, once
the invention is patented locally, anyone who does try to adapt the
invention becomes a potential infringer.
Even when an invention is not covered by a domestic utility
patent, there can be a problem under an absolute novelty standard.
That is, under the WIPO prior art policy, the mere existence of an
invention anywhere in the world can be enough to put that invention,
and even the incremental improvements needed to make efficient use
of it, in the public domain.86 The basic invention will no longer be
considered novel, and incremental improvements will often not be
considered sufficiently inventive to merit independent protection.87
Admittedly, that result—the public availability of existing inventions
and marginal variations on them—was WIPO’s objective in promoting

83.
See PAUL STONEMAN, THE ECONOMICS OF TECHNOLOGICAL DIFFUSION 178–90 (2002);
Alessandra Canepa & Paul Stoneman, Comparative International Diffusion; Patterns,
Determinants, and Policies, 13 ECON. INNOVATION & NEW TECH. 279, 297 (2004); NATHAN
ROSENBERG, TECHNOLOGY AND AMERICAN ECONOMIC GROWTH 191 (Harper & Row 1972). See
generally Hall, supra note 22 (providing a historical and comparative perspective on diffusion that
looks at the broad determinants of diffusion, economic, social, and institutional, viewed from a
microeconomic perspective).
84.
See Hall, supra note 22, at 460 (“[D]iffusion is not only the means by which innovations
become useful by being spread throughout a population, it is also an intrinsic part of the innovation
process, as learning, imitation, and feedback effects which arise during the spread of a new
technology enhance the original innovation.”).
85.
Cf. Layal Liverpool, Researchers from Global South Under-Represented in
Development Research, NATURE (Sept. 17, 2021), https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-02102549-9 [https://perma.cc/Y9Q6-Z7GK] (explaining that most research conducted on development
in the Global South is conducted by researchers from the Global North); Verónica Amarante,
Ronelle Burger, Grieve Chelwa, John Cockburn, Ana Kassouf, Andrew McKay & Julieta
Zurbrigg, Underrepresentation of Developing Country Researchers in Development
Research,
APPLIED
ECON.
LETTERS,
Aug.
12,
2021,
at
4,
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/13504851.2021.1965528?needAccess=true
[https://perma.cc/YN3H-7BCC] (finding that the bulk of the research on the global south is
conducted by the global north).
86.
WIPO Novelty Study, supra note 75.
87.
Id.
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an absolute novelty standard for utility patents.88 As we saw, its
negotiators thought that releasing an invention from legal constraints
would ensure its public availability.89 However, it is simplistic to equate
the existence of an invention in the public domain with its effective
availability to those who could benefit from it. Customization, training,
feedback loops, and networking may be required. Moreover, potential
consumers may be unable to discern from remote disclosures that
inventions capable of improving their welfare are available. From the
perspective of the South, the absolute novelty standard thus constitutes
a trap out of which new technologies cannot always emerge.
A. Structure
As noted above, we propose a second-tier regime that includes
three key features: a relative novelty standard, an inventive step
measured by the capacities of domestic artisans, and a disclosure
requirement geared to local absorptive capacity.90 Properly designed,
this regime—a diffusion patent system—would break the novelty trap,
create the incentives needed, and avert the associated social losses.
And, as explained earlier, it would also function as the type of detour
that Keun Lee suggested would enable countries to begin the process of
becoming technologically adept in their own right.91 In addition to
discussing these modifications, this section considers other issues that
a state implementing the system would be required to consider. These
include questions on the scope of protection, who should be allowed to
obtain these patents, and at what pricing?
1. Relative Novelty
The key to breaking the novelty trap is to redefine the landscape
of prior art so that only disclosures that are locally accessible are
relevant to the determination of whether an invention is novel and thus
worthy of patent protection. As Part II suggested, it can require
intellectual labor to identify and import remote knowledge and engage
in the efforts required to diffuse it domestically.92 Thus, awarding a
form of intellectual property protection is easily justified: the protection

88.
Traditional Knowledge and Intellectual Property – Background Brief, WIPO,
https://www.wipo.int/pressroom/en/briefs/tk_ip.html [https://perma.cc/NL6G-M9WT] (last visited
Jan. 22, 2022).
89.
See supra text accompanying notes 76–78.
90.
See supra text accompanying note 29.
91.
See supra text accompanying note 64.
92.
See supra Part II.
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not only recognizes the intellectual contributions necessary for
diffusion, but also provides economic motivation to engage in that work.
Local accessibility could, of course, mean more than one thing.
One approach would be to consider an invention inaccessible only when
it is not patented, published, or practiced locally. For this purpose, a
country could consider an invention patented if it is covered by a patent
that has been awarded, if it is covered by a patent application that is
pending, or if the priority period provided by the Paris Convention for
obtaining patents in third countries has not lapsed.93 These are the
most difficult inventions for a local innovator to identify as potentially
useful domestically. Moreover, because learning by doing or observing
is not possible, they are the hardest for a local to duplicate, improve
upon, and distribute. Thus, their diffusion requires considerable
intellectual effort, effort that readily justifies a separate incentive
system. Diffusion patents for such inventions also make sense because
if an invention is not patented locally, there is no possibility of
infringement. Moreover, if the invention is not locally patented, there
may be no one else with a strong incentive to do what is necessary to
diffuse it.
A system that awards patents on this basis would have another
advantage. Knowing that the failure to patent would allow another to
obtain a diffusion patent, the original innovator might itself choose to
obtain a utility patent, publish, or practice the invention locally. In
other words, the potential for diffusion patents might spur foreign
inventors to engage in local diffusion-oriented activities. Diffusion by
foreign right holders would not necessarily be as effective in promoting
an ecosystem conducive to technological self-sufficiency as awarding
local diffusion patents, but it would surely provide jobs and training,
bring in foreign investment, and create opportunities for locals to
interact with foreign innovators and learn from their entrepreneurial
cultures.
At the same time, however, it must be recognized that under a
regime that considers local patents and publications to be in the prior
art, whether worked or not, a foreign innovator could block local
inventors by patenting or publishing locally but not doing the work
needed to make the invention effectively available. As noted above, the
PCT has sharply reduced the cost of that tactic.94 There are two ways a
country could counter that problem while also dealing with foreign
patent holders who try to exploit locally and fail. First, the country
93.
See Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, supra note 51, 21
U.S.T. at 1631–35, 828 U.N.T.S. at 313, 315, 317, 319.
94.
See supra Part III.
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could define the prior art to include only inventions practiced locally,
even if a local utility patent had been granted, and include in the patent
regime a compulsory license system to deal with the problem of blocking
patents—that is, the inability of the holder of the diffusion patent to
exploit it without licensing the utility patent and the inability of the
utility patent holder to sell the adapted invention without the
authorization of the diffusion patentee. The possibility that a
compulsory license might be granted would put more pressure on
foreign inventors to engage in exploitation efforts. Moreover, the
compulsory license would recognize the contribution made by the
original inventor and provide compensation for that effort.
Alternatively, a country could require the holder of a local utility
patent to work it locally within a reasonable time period (under the
Paris Convention, four years from the date of the patent application or
three years from issuance).95 If the patentee chose to work, the benefits
of jobs, training, foreign investment, and learning would be realized. If
that period lapsed without working, then a diffusion patent could be
awarded. Again, compulsory licenses could be used to break blocking
positions.
2. Inventive Step
Novelty is a technical impediment to patenting because it
requires the presence of all the elements of the invention in a single
piece of prior art.96 In contrast, the inventive step, or nonobviousness,
requirement allows examiners to consider whether a person of ordinary
skill in the relevant art could combine disclosures from multiple sources
to make the leap to the claimed invention. Thus, this requirement
creates a stronger impediment to patenting than novelty.97
Changing the prior art landscape is one way to alter this
requirement for diffusion patents because it means that the only art
that can be considered is art that is published, practiced, or patented
locally (or perhaps only art that is practiced locally). As argued, that
would significantly reduce the source material from which elements can
be drawn.98 But more could be accomplished. Because all innovations
combine elements of what is already known, the inventiveness standard
requires countries to decide how much ingenuity is needed to merit
protection. That has long been a controversial issue, and in many
95.
Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, supra note 51, 21 U.S.T. at
1637, 828 U.N.T.S. at 321.
96.
For an example drawn from US law, see In re Robertson, 169 F.3d 743 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
97.
See, e.g., Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 12–13, 17–19 (1966).
98.
See supra Part II.
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countries, the height of the inventive step has fluctuated over time.99 In
the United States, for example, it has gone from very high in the
mid-1900s to extremely low toward the turn of the century, settling in
2007 in the middle.100 The current standard looks to the person having
ordinary skill in that art (PHOSITA), a person who is deemed to have
the capacity to make predictable advances and repurpose known
inventions in response to market and design pressures.101 US
examiners, therefore, ask whether that person could have reacted to
market forces to make the advance in question based on the art in the
person’s field. They would also examine other art that a person in the
field would consider in solving the problem faced (analogous art).102 If
not, the invention is considered patentable.
For diffusion patents, these questions should be modified to deal
with local conditions. Thus, rather than measure the capacity of
PHOSITA by global standards,103 the inquiry should be limited to the
inventive capabilities of domestic artisans and the art they would
regard as within their field or analogous to it. As important, examiners
in low-income countries should consider the effect of market forces in
their own environment. As noted earlier, in the North, high-income
customers spur demand.104 However, the diffusion patent regime should
99.
See generally LODEWIJK W.P. PESSERS, THE INVENTIVENESS REQUIREMENT IN PATENT
LAW: AN EXPLORATION OF ITS FOUNDATIONS AND FUNCTIONING (2016) (providing an overview of
the inventive step over time and around the world). For an example of Australia’s inventive step
reform, see Intellectual Property Laws Amendment (Raising the Bar) Act 2012 (Cth); Explanatory
Memorandum, Intellectual Property Laws Amendment (Raising the Bar) Bill 2011 (Cth) 8. For an
example of New Zealand’s inventive step reform, see Patent Act 2013, s 7. For a general discussion
of these two examples, see Benoliel & Gishboliner, supra note 14, at 8–12, 22–23 (comparing the
effects of New Zealand’s patent reform to those of Australia’s).
100.
Compare Cuno Eng’g Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp., 314 U.S. 84, 91 (1941)
(requiring the invention to encompass a “flash of creative genius”), with In re Sang Su Lee, 277
F.3d 1338, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (requiring a teaching, suggestion, or motivation in the prior art
to combine references), and KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 419 (2007) (“[T]he
obviousness analysis cannot be confined by a formalistic conception of the words teaching,
suggestion, and motivation, or by overemphasis on the importance of published articles and the
explicit content of issued patents.”).
101.
KSR Int’l Co., 550 U.S., at 421. A roughly similar approach is used in other
countries. See generally Standing Comm. on the L. of Pats., Study of Inventive
Step, WIPO Doc. SCP/22/3 (2015), https://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/scp/en/scp_22/scp_22_3.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9BEW-JX42] (explaining that the inventive step analysis is based on the
assessment made by a “person skilled in the art”).
102.
See, e.g., In re Clay, 966 F.2d 656, 658–59 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
103.
35 U.S.C. § 103.
104.
See, e.g., Stanley L. Engerman & Kenneth L. Sokoloff, Inequality, Institutions and
Differential Paths of Growth among New World Economies, in INSTITUTIONS, CONTRACTS AND
ORGANIZATIONS: PERSPECTIVES FROM NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 108 (Claude Ménard ed.,
2000); 2008 World Bank Report, supra note 23, at 6 (noting the effect of demand on the supply of
technology-based inventions).
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also account for the absence of that force in the South. Structuring the
regime in this way would permit a local inventor to acquire protection
for adaptations of foreign inventions even when the changes are ones
that the North might consider to be too modest to merit protection. For
example, it would allow inventors who technologically adapt patented
seeds to local growing conditions to obtain protection.105 It would
similarly encourage domestic inventors to modify pharmaceuticals
developed elsewhere to meet the needs of local patients, who might find
the originator’s version unpalatable or who might not have the
refrigeration necessary to store it.106 It would also spur inventors to
educate consumers and find ways, such as new manufacturing
techniques, to make inventions available at more locally affordable
prices.107
The PHOSITA standard has another useful feature: it operates
as a policy lever that promotes technological advancement.108 As Dan
Burk and Mark Lemley suggest, when a new technology emerges, the
knowledge in that area will be minimal.109 Because PHOSITA—a
person having ordinary skill in the art—will, at that point, have only
modest capacities, even small advances will be considered inventive.110
Naturally, it will be relatively easy to acquire patent protection. The
ease of obtaining patents will attract other innovators. Once that
happens, more art is produced, thereby expanding the knowledge base.
As the field matures, those practicing in it will become more
sophisticated, which will raise the standard for obtaining protection.111
Inventors will then realize they must be more ambitious to merit a
patent.
105.
See, e.g., Emily Marden, R. Nelson Godfrey, Matthew R. Voell & Loren H. Riesberg,
Biosafety and Intellectual Property Regimes as Elements of the IP-Regulatory Complex: The Case
of Canadian Sunflower Genomics, in THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY-REGULATORY COMPLEX:
OVERCOMING BARRIERS TO INNOVATION IN AGRICULTURAL GENOMICS 15, 27 (Emily Marden, R.
Nelson Godfrey & Rachel Manion eds., 2016).
106.
See id. at 27–28; HILDE STEVENS, ISABELLE HUYS, KOENRAAD DEBACKERE, MICHEL
GOLDMAN, PHILIP STEVENS & RICHARD T. MAHONEY, VACCINES: ACCELERATING
INNOVATION
AND
ACCESS:
GLOBAL
CHALLENGES
REPORT
17
(2017),
https://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/wipo_pub_gc_16.pdf [https://perma.cc/76S8-PWQD].
107.
For a discussion on educating customers on product usage in developing countries,
see, for example, COIMBATORE KRISHNARAO PRAHALAD, THE FORTUNE AT THE BOTTOM OF THE
PYRAMID: ERADICATING POVERTY THROUGH PROFITS 26 (2006).
108.
Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575,
1651 (2003).
109.
Id. at 1576–77.
110.
Id. at 1618–19.
111.
See, e.g., In re Kubin, 561 F.3d 1351, 1358–59 (Fed Cir. 2009) (raising the difficulty of
obtaining a biotech patent from the standard used in In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1995),
when the field was less mature).
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That same insight can be applied geographically. If the skill of
the ordinary artisan is determined based on local—rather than
global—abilities, advances that may be considered uninventive if
measured by international standards might nonetheless be found to
merit patent protection when created locally. As the level of
technological capacity within a country grows, a person with
ordinary skill in the art will be deemed to know more. As a result, the
inventive step will rise with it, and simple adaptations will no longer be
enough; local inventors will be forced to become increasingly creative.
The field will, in this way, move towards the knowledge frontier.
3. Disclosure
In a sense, the heart of the patent bargain lies in the disclosure
requirement because it is this requirement that obliges the applicant,
in exchange for a period of exclusivity, to provide enough information
about the invention so that people can enjoy it after the patent has
expired.112 Here again, the capacity of PHOSITA matters because the
question examiners ask is whether the disclosure is sufficient for a
person of ordinary skill in the art to make and use the invention without
undue experimentation.113
The standard of the ordinary local inventor may have several
useful consequences. Because a midlevel inventor is likely to require
considerable direction to practice an invention, this standard will
require a diffusion patent to contain more information than the North
typically demands for utility patents. Codification of more information
will then make it easier for subsequent innovators to identify valuable
art and figure out how to make and use it. With more art available, local
inventors will become more proficient, ambitious, and able to catch up.
Thus, even if patent disclosures tend to have a limited impact on
research and development in the North, as some claim,114 diffusion
patents could be of considerable benefit in the South if they are geared
to teach artisans with low absorptive capacity. Given that patents are
drafted in the language of the relevant patent office, these patents

112.
See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 112; DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS: A TREATISE ON
LAW OF PATENTABILITY, VALIDITY AND INFRINGEMENT 7–9 (2010); Robert P. Merges,
Commercial Success and Patent Standards: Economic Perspectives on Innovation, 76 CAL. L. REV.
805, 808 (1988).
113.
See, e.g., In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
114.
See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Ignoring Patents, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 19, 21–22. There
has long been a debate in the North as to whether patent disclosures matter to innovation. See
Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Do Patents Disclose Useful Information?, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 531,
547–51 (2012) (refuting claims that scientists do not read patents).
THE

2022

NOVELTY TRAPS

463

would have the added advantage of providing this information in the
local language.115
B. Implementation
In addition to adopting altered standards for the novelty,
inventive step, and disclosure requirements of patent law, a country
implementing a diffusion patent regime would also need to decide on
the scope of the rights awarded, the beneficiaries of the regime, and
various pricing questions.
1. Scope
Two factors determine the scope of a patent right: the breadth of
coverage and the duration of protection.116 The disclosure requirement
discussed above is also used in the determination of breadth because it
limits the claims to the information that is revealed in the
specification.117 For those who may be concerned about adding another
layer of protection to an intellectual property system that already
inhibits access to inventions, this is an important feature. If properly
enforced,118 the limitation aspect of disclosure ensures that a country
that awards diffusion patents receives knowledge commensurate with
the added cost associated with awarding protection. Since these patents
would be geared toward encouraging marginal advances, they would
only cover a narrow range of products or processes. Thus, others would
be free to find other adaptations and uses for the underlying invention.
The second layer of patenting could also be constrained by a limit
on the duration of protection. The patent period should be long enough
to allow the right holder to capture a return on investment, but not so
long that it creates its own novelty trap and inhibits further innovation.
As J.H. Reichman noted in his exhaustive study of petit patents, the
term of protection under these systems is usually well below the twenty
years required by the TRIPS Agreement for utility patents.119

115.
But see Michael N. Meller, Piercing the Language Veil - Transparency in Patent
Applications, 85 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 22, 24 (2003) (arguing for the adoption of
English as the lingua franca of patent proceedings).
116.
See Richard Gilbert & Carl Shapiro, Optimal Patent Length and Breadth, 21 RAND J.
ECON. 106, 106 (1990).
117.
See, e.g., Invitrogen Corp. v. Clontech Lab’ys Inc., 429 F.3d 1052, 1071–74 (Fed. Cir.
2005).
118.
Cf. Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 533–34 (1966) (noting “the highly developed art
of drafting patent claims so that they disclose as little useful information as possible.”).
119.
Reichman, supra note 28, at 2457–58; TRIPS, supra note 5, art. 33.
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2. Beneficiaries
Because national treatment is a cornerstone of the international
trade regime,120 a country must arguably award a diffusion patent to
anyone who invests in the work necessary to make the invention
available to its population. However, that practice could defeat the goals
of adopting a diffusion patent regime. To be sure, if foreigners were
allowed to obtain diffusion patents, they would be more motivated to
modify their inventions in ways that meet Southern needs. They might
also increase jobs and learning opportunities. However, as long as
foreigners are more technically proficient than domestic inventors, local
innovators could easily be crowded out of the system.121 As a result,
domestic innovation would not receive direct encouragement. Countries
may therefore wish to limit diffusion patents to their own innovators or
to their own inventors plus those from similarly situated countries.
That limitation would, however, arguably violate the nondiscrimination
provisions of the TRIPS Agreement.122 Part V takes up the question of
the conformity of our proposal to international intellectual property
law.123
Countries intent on developing a diffusion patent system to
supplement utility patents could develop a common patent system akin
to the system that the European Union is establishing. It would allow
an inventor to acquire a single patent that covers multiple countries.124
That would create a larger market for the holders of diffusion patents
and allow more countries to obtain the benefits of Northern
technology.125

120.
Mitsuo Matsushita, Basic Principles of the WTO and the Role of Competition Policy, 3
WASH. U. GLOB. STUD. L. REV. 363, 366 (2004).
121.
See Xiaolan Fu, Carlo Pietrobelli & Luc Soete, The Role of Foreign Technology and
Indigenous Innovation in the Emerging Economies: Technological Change and Catching-Up, 39
WORLD DEV. 1204, 1207 (2011) (noting the possibility that foreign investments may crowd out local
innovation).
122.
TRIPS, supra note 5, arts. 3–4.
123.
See discussion infra Part VI.
124.
Unitary Patent & Unified Patent Court, EUR. PAT. OFF., https://www.epo.org/law-practice/unitary.html [https://perma.cc/8X77-Y5VP] (last visited Jan. 24, 2022).
125.
See EUR. PAT. OFF., UNITARY PATENT GUIDE 10 (2017), https://documents.epo.org/projects/babylon/eponet.nsf/0/C3ED1E790D5E75E0C125818000325A9B/$File/Unitary_Patent_guide_en.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4HW6-PLHK]. A regional patent system would also have the advantage of
reducing administrative costs; a single nation’s patent office could examine applications on behalf
of an entire region. Id. at 10–11.
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3. Pricing
Diffusion patents could incur inventive costs and reduce access
implying pricing considerations. On the whole, it seems unlikely that
prices would put these inventions out of local reach because, under the
basic system, the holder of the right could only sell the invention in
countries where the original inventor did not receive a patent. Thus, the
price would depend on local demand and purchasing power. Admittedly,
the right holder could base the price on the demand of only the
highest-income local customers.126 In that instance, a country could
impose price controls or price caps on advances protected by diffusion
patents.127
A country that decides to award diffusion patents based on the
failure of the utility patentee to practice will face another pricing issue.
Because the utility patent would block the holder of the diffusion patent
from exploiting her invention (and vice versa), compulsory licenses
might be needed to break the blocking position, a scenario that is
especially likely if the initial patent is overbroad.128 The issuance of a
license would, of course, require the party with the less valuable patent
to pay royalties to the other—under TRIPS, “adequate remuneration in
the circumstances of each case, taking into account the economic value
of the authorization.”129 Still, access should not be a profound concern
because adequacy under the circumstances would allow for
consideration of the purchasing power of local customers.
IV. JUSTIFICATIONS
The previous Part recommended the introduction of a
second-tier of patent protection, a right that encourages the efforts
needed to diffuse new technologies within low-income countries.130
Designed as a detour, diffusion patents would also grow the South’s
creative ecosystem, promote technological self-sufficiency in priority
areas, and enable these countries to catch up technologically to the
126.
See Brook K. Baker, Patents, Pricing, and Access to Essential Medicines in
Developing Countries, 11 VIRTUAL MENTOR 527, 527 (2009) (noting that pharmaceutical
companies maximize profit by selling medicines at prices only the rich and well-insured can
afford).
127.
Cf. id. at 528–29 (comparing alternative strategies to correct this “market failure”).
128.
Cf. Correa, supra note 52, at 10–11 (exploring varying international approaches to this
issue). The “refusal to deal” is a ground for granting a compulsory license in many national laws.
Id. at 10-11.
129.
TRIPS, supra note 5, art. 31. In addition, the holder of the utility patent “shall be
entitled to a cross-licence on reasonable terms . . . .” Id.
130.
See discussion supra Section III.A.
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developed world. This Part takes a closer look at the reasons we believe
this system will achieve these goals. In part, our view is based on
observations of how developing countries have structured their patent
systems over time. In addition, we consider the economic literature in
greater depth and discuss how it supports our recommendations.
A. Observations
As noted in Part II, Keun Lee’s view, that a second-tier patent
regime can facilitate catch-up, stemmed from his study of how other
countries developed and, in particular, from a comparison among
countries in Latin America and Asia that were originally situated
similarly but later diverged sharply in their technological proficiency.131
Admittedly, his observations do not establish causality.132 Still, the
number of examples of technologically advanced jurisdictions that had
modified patent regimes during their development period is probative
of the benefits of this approach.133
The United States’ 2011 America Invents Act (AIA) is a prime
example of a national policy that took one approach to the requirements
for patent protection when the country was behind the technological
frontier and then adopted a more rigorous standard when it became
innovative at world levels.134 Prior to the AIA, information “known or
used,” “on sale or in public use,” or “made. . . by another inventor” was
regarded as in the prior art only if the knowledge, sale, use, or invention
took place in the United States.135 However, for patents applied for on
or after March 16, 2013, the AIA regards information “in public use, on
sale, or otherwise available to the public” as prior art no matter where
the use, sale, or availability is located.136 In addition, under pre-AIA
law, information in patent applications was considered prior art only as

131.
132.
133.

See LEE, supra note 27, at 149, 163–68.
See id.
See, e.g., KEUN LEE, THE ART OF ECONOMIC CATCH-UP: BARRIERS, DETOURS, AND
LEAPFROGGING IN INNOVATION SYSTEMS 61, 117–18 (2019) (highlighting the successes of Hyundai
Motors and Samsung in South Korea’s automobile and electronics industries, respectively). In the
case of Taiwan, examples include the numerous fully foreign-owned and joint-venture firms in the
television industry from the late 1960s to the 1980s. See ALICE H. AMSDEN & WAN-WEN CHU,
BEYOND LATE DEVELOPMENT: TAIWAN’S UPGRADING POLICIES 19–20, 23–24 (2003).
134.
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284; see infra text
accompanying notes 136–49. Other countries have also moved in this direction. See Patents Act
2013, s 8 (N.Z.); PRC Patent Law, supra note 79, art. 23.
135.
Act of July 19, 1952, Pub L. 82-593, § 102, 66 Stat. 792, 797–98, amended by
American Inventors Protection Act of 1999, Pub L. No. 106-113 app. I, § 4806, 113 Stat.
1501A-552, 1501A-590 (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 102).
136.
35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1).
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of their US filing date (and only if the US patent was eventually granted
or the application published).137 Under current law, in similar
circumstances, disclosures in US patent applications are effective as of
their foreign filing date.138 In other words, information disclosed in
foreign patent applications can now become part of the prior art
landscape.139
The value of the older rules to the United States is clear. Foreign
inventors could not block the issuance of US patents based on most of
their foreign inventive activity.140 An inventor working offshore could,
in short, find that if it later wanted to exploit an invention it made first,
it would be required to pay royalties to a later inventor who did its work
in the United States.141 To prevent that occurrence, someone who
created knowledge abroad was under pressure to bring the advance to
the United States quickly, by describing it in a publication, putting the
knowledge in a patent claim, or exploiting the inventions in the United
States in a manner that made their technological contributions locally
available.142
Although the AIA ended this practice there are ways in which
the United States continues to limit the prior art landscape to meet
policy objectives it regards as important for promoting innovation.143
For example, the current rule on novelty removes from the prior art
disclosures made by the inventor or by someone who derived the
invention from the inventor, if they are made within a year of the
inventor’s patent application.144 It also removes certain art made by
another after a public disclosure by the inventor or by someone who
derived the invention from the inventor. Furthermore, it removes
certain art in patent applications that were filed after a public
disclosure by the inventor or by someone who derived the invention
from the inventor.145 Finally, in some circumstances, if the art in two
patent applications is owned by, or subject to assignment to, the same
entity, the art disclosed in the first application cannot be used against
137.
See Act of July 19, 1952 § 102(e), amended by Intellectual Property and High
Technology Technical Amendments Act of 2002, Pub L. No. 107-273, § 13205, 116 Stat. 1901,
1902–03 (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2)); accord In re Hilmer, 359 F.2d 859, 882 (C.C.P.A. 1966).
138.
See 35 U.S.C. §§ 102(d)(2), 119.
139.
See id.
140.
See Act of July 19, 1952 § 104 (repealed 2011).
141.
See id. § 119 (amended 2012).
142.
Cf. W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1549–50 (Fed. Cir. 1983)
(holding that one party’s “secret use” of a foreign machine cannot bar the later grant of a patent
by another).
143.
See, for example, the exceptions for recent disclosures in 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)(1).
144.
Id. § 102(b)(1)(A).
145.
Id. § 102(b)(1)(B).
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the second application.146 None of these new rules appears designed (or
needed) to help the United States catch up technologically, but each is
thought to improve the creative environment. These rules establish a
grace period that allows inventors to share their nascent inventions
with a community that can help improve them.147 They also allow
inventors to give potential users notice of the innovation and enable
researchers in the same firm to collaborate with each other without fear
that transfers of knowledge will invalidate patent rights.148
Japan and the Asian Tigers—a group of countries that have
caught up to the technological frontier in the last few
decades—demonstrate the value of a patent regime geared toward the
capacity of local midlevel inventors.149 For example, in a study
sponsored by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD), Nagesh Kumar showed that strong intellectual
property rights adversely affected absorption of knowledge spillovers,
while countries that started with “soft” regimes, which favor local
inventors, prospered.150 Before TRIPS, Japan explicitly designed its
patent policy to favor domestic inventors and encourage absorption
spillovers from foreign activities.151 It promoted a patenting culture
with a utility model and an industrial design system that allowed and
motivated local inventors to modify inventions made elsewhere. Kumar
found that Taiwan and Korea took a similar approach.152 Thus, he
states:
[T]he east Asian countries, viz, Japan, Korea, and Taiwan have absorbed a substantial amount of technological learning under weak intellectual property protection
regimes during the early phases. These patent regimes facilitated the absorption of
innovation and knowledge generated abroad by their indigenous firms. They have
also encouraged incremental innovations on foreign inventions by domestic enterprises and developed a patent culture through utility models and design patents. As

146.
Id. § 102(b)(2)(C).
147.
See H.R. REP. NO. 108-425, at 3 (2004) (noting that collaborative research “is an
essential pillar of the economy of the United States”); William G. Giltinan, The Disclosure
Function, Academic/Private Partnerships, and the Case for Affirmatively Used, Multinational
Grace Periods, 22 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 109, 147 (2014) (highlighting the advantages of the early
disclosure of innovations); see also Frederik W. Struve, Ending Unnecessary Novelty
Destruction: Why Europe Should Adopt the Safety-Net Grace Period as an International Best
Practice, 39 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1404, 1409, 1418–25, 1438–40 (2013) (encouraging the major
international patent offices to adopt a safety-net grace period as a best practice).
148.
See Giltinan, supra note 147, at 147, 154.
149.
See Nagesh Kumar, Intellectual Property Rights, Technology and Economic
Development: Experiences of Asian Countries, 38 ECON. & POL. WKLY 209, 217 (2003) [hereinafter
Experiences of Asian Countries].
150.
Id. at 212.
151.
See id. at 214.
152.
See id. at 214–17.
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the local technological capabilities matured and the domestic industry sought
stronger protection for guarding their inventions, the IPR [intellectual property
rights] regime was strengthened….153

Countries have similarly varied how they implement the
inventiveness requirement. As noted above, the rule in the United
States has fluctuated, only recently settling on a version that considers
PHOSITA to be a person with a modicum of creativity, spurred by
exogenous forces.154 Prior to the change, only references that included
much more direction were considered capable of barring or invalidating
a patent.155 The landscape against which the inventive step is
determined has also varied over time and remains less absolute than
the novelty standard. Thus, although all art can be used to determine
novelty, only art in the inventor’s field and in analogous fields are used
to decide on nonobviousness.156 Furthermore, although elements
inherent in a disclosure are considered for novelty purposes, they are
not combinable when determining inventiveness.157 The European
Patent Convention goes a step further and excludes disclosures in
patent applications from the inventiveness—but not the
novelty—determination.158 A 2004 study by the WIPO Standing
Committee on Patents showed that, at that time, there were similar
variations among all the countries that it surveyed.159
The utility models and design systems referenced by Kumar do
nearly the same thing: they furnish protection for incremental
advances.160 Germany, for example, has offered midlevel inventors of
products (but not processes) a “utility model” system that requires no
substantive examination.161 It also uses a relative novelty standard

153.
Id. at 217.
154.
See supra text accompanying notes 99–102; 35 U.S.C. § 103.
155.
See In re Sang–Su Lee, 277 F.3d at 1343 (citing In re Kotzab, 217 F.3d 1365, 1371
(Fed. Cir. 2000)) (stressing a “need for specificity” in analyzing the prior art when obviousness is
in question).
156.
See Nickola v. Peterson, 580 F.2d 898, 910–11 (6th Cir. 1978).
157.
See, e.g., Ruiz v. A.B. Chance Co., 234 F.3d 654, 665 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
158.
Convention on the Grant of European Patents art. 56, Oct. 5, 1973, 1065 U.N.T.S. 199.
159.
WIPO Novelty Study, supra note 75, at 10–20 (comparing several countries’ approaches).
160.
Experiences of Asian Countries, supra note 149, at 223.
161.
Gebrauchsmustergesetz [GebrMG] [Utility Model Law], Aug. 28, 1986,
BUNDESGESETZBLATT, Teil I [BGBL I] at 1455, § 8, last amended by Gesetz [G], Aug. 10, 2021,
BGBL I at 3490, art. 3 (Ger.); see Roland Liesegang, German Utility Models After the 1990 Reform
Act, 20 AIPLA Q.J. 1, 4, 6–7 (1992) (noting that Germany’s definition of prior art includes written
material and materials in public use). But cf. Experiences of Asian Countries, supra note 149, at
217–18 (referencing a development in Indian law that restricted the “scope of patentability . . . to
only processes and not products”).
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somewhat similar to the one we propose.162 Significantly, however,
interest in the system has declined over the years as firms have become
more inventive and turned their attention to utility patent protection.163
Dan Prud’homme observed an analogous trajectory in Asian
countries.164 Focusing on the world’s largest users of utility model
patents, namely China,165 Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, he found
that each country recalibrated its utility model regimes over time in
ways that mirrored that country’s stage of economic development.166
Thus, the regimes began by offering weak protection, as measured by
requirements for novelty, inventive step, and the use of an examination
procedure.167 That created a lower rung in the protective ladder and also
gave other inventors leeway to use the material in the disclosure for
their own purposes.168 As local innovators attained the proficiency
needed to use accumulated knowledge, the requirements for obtaining
rights became more demanding, and the regime offered broader
protection.169
Many industrialized countries followed a similar path.170 Some
have now dropped their lower-tier systems entirely.171 However, utility
model regimes endure in some places, and a handful of industrialized
countries still continue to experiment with them.172 The European
Union, for example, has considered adopting a utility model system as
a way to encourage improvements to known advances and to spur

162.
Compare Gebrauchsmustergesetz [GebrMG] [Utility Model Law], Aug. 28, 1986,
BGBL I at 1455, §§ 1–3, last amended by Gesetz [G], Aug. 10, 2021, BGBL I at 3490, art. 3 (Ger.)
(protecting inventions that are “new, involve an inventive step and are commercially
applicable”), with discussion supra Section III.A. (proposing “a second-tier regime that includes
three key features: a relative novelty standard, an inventive step measured by the capacities of
domestic artisans, and a disclosure requirement geared to local absorptive capacity.”).
163.
See Liesegang, supra note 161, at 2.
164.
See Dan Prud’homme, Utility Model Patent Regime “Strength” and Technological
Development: Experiences of China and Other East Asian Latecomers, 42 CHINA ECON. REV. 50, 67
(2017).
165.
Id. at 51.
166.
Id. at 59–61.
167.
See id. at 67.
168.
See id. at 52.
169.
Id. at 61.
170.
See, e.g., UMA SUTHERSANEN, UTILITY MODELS AND INNOVATION IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES 40–41 (2006), https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/iteipc20066_en.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4KND-4NFB].
171.
Tyler J. Boschert, Would Utility Models Improve American Innovation? Evidence from
Brazil, Germany, and the United States, 12 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 133, 144–145 (2014).
172.
Mark D. Janis, Second Tier Patent Protection, 40 HARV. INT’L L.J. 151, 166 (1999). As
suggested supra note 30, this approach might also benefit middle income countries.
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technological development within small and medium-sized firms.173
Although the justification for such patents is in some ways similar to
ours, these systems have arguably tended to pay little attention to the
prior art landscape. Thus, in defining the state of the art as “everything
made available to the public by means of a written or oral description,
by use, or in any other way, before the date of filing of the utility model
application,”174 the European Union’s system fails to break the novelty
trap.
B. Theory
As suggested earlier, economists have extensively studied why
technological progress has been slow in many low-income countries,
such as those in Latin America, and how it is that other countries,
including the Asian Tigers, have prospered.175 That work, which
identifies many key factors, also provides support for connecting the
availability of lower entry points in the intellectual property regime to
a country’s propensity to become innovative.176 We summarize that
literature here and demonstrate its connection to our proposals. To
begin, economists essentially see two deeply interconnected problems
which the following Section discusses. One is the lack of innovative
capacity; the other is the difficulty of diffusing Northern technology in
less-developed countries.
1. Capacity
The economics literature suggests that technological progress in
developing countries is largely a matter of dependency—it depends on
adopting ideas and technologies developed elsewhere.177 Innovation is a
173.
Amended Commission Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive Approximating the Legal Arrangements for the Protection of Inventions by Utility Model, at 2, COM
(1999) 309 final (Aug. 29, 2000).
174.
Id. at 5.
175.
See supra Section IV.A.
176.
See supra Section IV.A.
177.
See generally Hans Singer, Beyond Terms of Trade—Convergence and Divergence, 11
J. INT’L DEV. 911 (1999) (noting the differences in technological complexity between the goods
traded by developed and developing countries); Hans W. Singer, The Distribution of Gains
Between Investing and Borrowing Countries, 40 AM. ECON. REV. 473 (1950) (noting that export
industries in underdeveloped countries are highly dependent on foreign technology); Raúl
Prebisch, International Trade and Payments in an Era of Coexistence: Commercial Policy in the
Underdeveloped Countries, 59 AM. ECON. REV. 251 (1959) (noting the need for industrialization in
underdeveloped countries as technical progress spreads); RAÚL PREBISCH, THE
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF LATIN AMERICA AND ITS PRINCIPAL PROBLEMS (1950), https://repositorio.cepal.org/bitstream/handle/11362/29973/002_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/64TY-EXMX] (noting
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function of how socioeconomic, political, geographical, and legal
subsystems interact, and, importantly, it is contingent upon the
existence of diverse local capabilities.178 In particular, innovation
requires absorptive capacity, which is defined as “a set of organizational
routines and processes by which firms acquire, assimilate, transform,
and exploit knowledge to produce a dynamic organizational
capability.”179 Thus, the extent to which a country relies on foreign
technologies depends as much on its absorptive capacity as on its actual
development needs.180
A 2008 World Bank Report corroborates this observation.181 It
shows that much of the technological progress in developing countries
measured over two decades has been associated with an increase in the
exposure of developing countries to foreign technologies.182
Unfortunately, however, as the World Bank Report also demonstrates,
the capacity of the population of these countries to absorb technology
has improved much less.183 Lacking the capacity to create new or adapt
and improve existing technologies, average productivity and income
have remained low.184 Since these countries cannot generate
innovations at the technological frontier, those with a degree of
technical proficiency tend to rely instead on an explicit policy of copying
foreign technologies.185
Steven Schnaars, following Theodore Levitt’s 1966 seminal
article, Innovative Imitation, categorized several distinct types of
copying.186 These include counterfeits or product pirates, knockoffs or
clones, design copies, creative adaptations, technological leapfrogging,
and adaptation to another industry.187 Counterfeits and knockoffs are
that the economic development of certain Latin American countries depends heavily on foreign
investment).
178.
Following Sanjaya Lall’s seminal piece, Technological Capabilities and
Industrialization, 20 WORLD DEV. 165 (1992), technology capability, or capacity, became widely
discussed. See, e.g., Giacomo Zanello, Xiaolan Fu, Pierre Mohnen & Marc Ventresca, The
Creation and Diffusion of Innovation in Developing Countries: A Systematic Literature Review, 30
J. ECON. SURVS. 884, 904 (2016).
179.
Zahra & George, supra note 15; Fu & Zhang, supra note 20 (comparing absorptive
capacity policies of China and India in the Solar-PV Panel Industries).
180.
Zahra & George, supra note 15.
181.
2008 World Bank Report, supra note 23, at 7–13, 149–150.
182.
Id. at xi.
183.
Id. at 149.
184.
See id. at 150.
185.
Id. at 146.
186.
STEVEN P. SCHNAARS, MANAGING IMITATION STRATEGY: HOW LATER ENTRANTS SEIZE
MARKETS FROM PIONEERS 18–14 (1994); Theodore Levitt, Innovative Imitation, 44 HARV. BUS. REV.
63, 63 (1966).
187.
SCHNAARS, supra note 186, at 5–8.
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duplicative imitations. Counterfeits are copies sold under the same
brand name as the original, often of lower quality, thereby depriving
the innovator of owed profits.188 Knockoffs or clones are different.
Because they are based on products that are not (or no longer) protected
by intellectual property, they are legally sold at lower prices. Clones
may even exceed the original in quality.189 From a development
economics perspective, however, an economic policy based on
imitation—of any kind—does not convey a sustainable competitive
advantage, even when the copying is legal. If the wage cost in the
imitator’s country is significantly lower than the originator’s, the
imitator will enjoy a competitive edge in price. However, that advantage
tends to be of limited duration. Eventually, lower-wage countries step
in and take the market.190
However, adjacent to policies supporting copying are policies
directed at technology adaptation. These are more beneficial for at least
two reasons. First, an edge here is likely to be more durable. Second,
adaptation of foreign technology makes it possible for locals to
understand the benefits of these advances, use them, and progress
technologically. Indeed, many developing countries that began with
simple technologies (and low-intensity R&D), such as textiles, clothing,
food processing, and wood products, were able to rely on such policies to
advance to somewhat more complex industries, such as metals,
petroleum refining, or metal products.191 In this regard, the 2008 World
Bank Report notes the importance of both imports and exports.192
Importing foreign technology helps developing countries raise the
quality of their own products and production methods.193 Exports put
locals in contact with those who can provide them with guidance on how
to meet global demand. Exportation also exposes domestic producers to
foreign competition.194
As the World Bank explains, countries differ in the ways and the
rapidity with which they improve their capacity to invent.195 The World
Bank characterizes some countries as “traditionalist slow learners.”196

188.
Id.
189.
Id.
190.
See, e.g., Kim & Nelson, supra note 56.
191.
U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, World Investment Report 2005:
Transnational Corporations and the Internalization of R&D, 107–11 (2005), https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/wir2005_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/X9FQ-PKM5].
192.
2008 World Bank Report, supra note 23, at 109–110.
193.
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194.
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195.
Id. at 110.
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These countries rely heavily on learning from imports.197 Others are
considered “passive FDI dependent;”198 they develop competencies from
higher-tech exports.199 Finally, some countries are categorized as
“active FDI-dependent;” they strive to develop a strong domestic
technological base.200 Presumably, the differences stem from cultural
and educational factors as well as from differences in their ability to
attract FDI and technological assistance. However, given enough time,
all of these learning techniques can lead to significant improvements in
technological competence.201 For example, Bangladesh, which the
World Bank considered a slow learner in 2008, has since developed a
vibrant manufacturing sector supported by its growing technological
capability.202 Significantly, in the last two decades, it has set up systems
to ensure that rural communities can access the internet and
information, created a portal for training, and improved its system of
higher education.203
The countries that succeed in expanding their capabilities may,
in the end, enjoy special advantages from entering foreign competition
as latecomers.204 Thus, even in the North, there is often a lag between
the time a new technology is created and the time it is adopted.205 First,
197.
Id.
198.
Id.
199.
Id.
200.
Id.
201.
See generally U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, Facilitating Transfer
of Technology to Developing Countries: A Survey of Home-Country Measures,
UNCTAD/ITE/IPC/2004/5 (2004) [hereinafter UNCTAD Tech Transfer Report] (providing an
overview of developed countries’ attempts and incentives to transfer technology to
developing
countries),
https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/iteipc20045_en.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Z4YC-5TCA].
202.
See, e.g., Word Bank Group [WBG], Bangladesh: Improving Productivity and
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https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2021/06/24/bangladesh-improving-productivity-and-technology-adaption-key-to-a-globally-competitive-manufacturing-sector
[https://perma.cc/UX75-YHCZ] (citing Yunfan Gu, Gaurav Nayyar & Siddharth Sharma, Gearing
Up for the Future of Manufacturing in Bangladesh, WORLD BANK GROUP [WBG] (2021),
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/35879 [https://perma.cc/PN3S-W657]).
203.
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Development, WORLD BANK BLOG (Oct. 8, 2017), https://blogs.worldbank.org/endpovertyinsouthasia/tech-revolution-helps-boost-bangladesh-s-development
[https://perma.cc/C7YD-HAXC]; Stefan Trines, Education in Bangladesh, WORLD EDUC. NEWS &
REV.
(Aug.
1,
2019),
https://wenr.wes.org/2019/08/education-in-bangladesh
[https://perma.cc/EFT9-TGE3].
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See, e.g., Elise S. Brezis, Paul R. Krugman & Daniel Tsiddon, Leapfrogging in
International Competition: A Theory of Cycles in National Technological Leadership, 83 AM. ECON.
REV. 1211, 1218 (1993).
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Diego Comin & Bart Hobijn, Cross-Country Technology Adoption: Making the
Theories Face the Facts, 51 J. MONETARY ECON. 39, 61–62 (2004).
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firms are reluctant to invest in new technology because they cannot
always recover the sunk costs associated with the technology they
already possess.206 Second, it can be difficult for them to retrain workers
and switch old employees to a new system of doing business.207 In
comparison, countries with newly acquired capacity do not experience
these problems: when they enter the field, they do so with the latest
equipment and skills and can accordingly capture gains from using
more efficient equipment and production methods.208 As a result,
numerous countries have experienced these latecomer advantages and
have proven that they can compete effectively on the world stage. These
countries include Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, where rapid
post-war growth was rooted in the successful acquisition, imitation, and
copying of technologies initially developed in industrialized
economies.209
2. Technology Diffusion
The question then becomes: Why do industries in developing
countries, which could potentially enjoy latecomer advantages, not
regularly leapfrog over industries in advanced economies? Here, as the
World Bank report shows, the core problem is that capacity can require
familiarity with foreign inventions, yet the diffusion of new technologies
can be extremely slow, especially in developing countries.210 The World
Bank looked at 102 country-technology pairings and compared how long
it took, from the time of invention, for adoption to reach specified
levels.211 Over time, the pace of diffusion improved everywhere, but, at
all points, it was faster in high-income countries than in low-income
countries.212
Economists have developed a variety of models to identify and
characterize technology diffusion.213 Capacity is (ironically) a major
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See Joseph Stiglitz, Technological Change, Sunk Cost, and Competition, 3 BROOKINGS
PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 883, 889 (1987).
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211.
Id.
212.
Id.
213.
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economic development over time in the United States). For a review of these models, see Comin &
Hobijn, supra note 205, at 61–69 (listing vintage capital theory; a vintage human capital
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factor influencing the willingness to take risks on new-to-the-country
and market technologies, as well as basic technological literacy, and the
skills needed to undertake the research necessary to understand,
implement, and adapt modern technologies.214 However, other factors
are important as well, including the availability of financing, means for
capital accumulation, the rate at which information is exchanged, and
thus the presence of networks of learning.215 Of considerable
importance are the net gains that firms expect to enjoy should they
implement new technology.216 Since revenue depends on the willingness
of consumers to purchase their product, the buyers’ absorptive capacity
and the resources they have for learning are important here as well, as
does the suitability of the product to their needs.217
Aiding this process is complex. Both FDI and licensing
opportunities can play an important role because they help make
imported technologies available, sometimes without added domestic
investment.218 Furthermore, they produce technology spillovers; local
workers receive training and accumulate experience as they deal with
investors, which are typically multinational foreign firms.219 Foreign
affiliations can also give local workers the opportunity to work in other
locations where they can learn management skills.220 Their
growing familiarity with high-tech products and techniques for
using them eases the domestic adoption of similar—sometimes
adapted—technology.221 Public-private partnerships and other sorts of
affiliations can have a similar impact.222
In some countries, migration has also proved to be significant.
While the so-called brain drain can deplete the population of technically
trained individuals, the diaspora can also constitute a resource.223 It
establishes connections between countries at different stages of
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development and creates access to networks of learning.224 Moreover,
some migrants return with the knowledge and skills needed to bring
foreign technologies home.225 In India, for example, Sam Pitroda, an
Indian-American, founded the Center for Development of Telematics,
which introduced rural telephone exchanges that were cheap to
maintain and designed to operate without air conditioning.226 This
adaptation later diffused to other developing countries.227
Trade can also be a significant factor in improving the rate of
diffusion. As Diego Comin and Bart Hobijn have observed, it has a push
and pull effect.228 Pushing—making sales of foreign technology into
developing countries—gives locals exposure to high-tech products and
to their advantages.229 In addition, these sellers have the incentives Zvi
Griliches observed in connection with hybrid corn, which prompt them
to help adapt the technology to local conditions.230 Pulling happens
because the domestic rivals of the firms that import the technology
must adopt it themselves to stay competitive.231
These intertwined considerations—capacity and diffusion—
provide developing countries with a choice of strategies. Some nations
have made technological progress by emphasizing the capacity aspect
of the problem. China, for example, has directed considerable efforts to
building the capabilities of its domestic science and technology
sectors.232 Bangladesh now has a major pharmaceutical industry and
has reached the point where it could, for instance, probably be
manufacturing COVID-19 vaccines.233 Other countries have focused on
diffusion. Thus, the Green Revolution in India is largely attributable to
the improvements to agricultural productivity and performance made
possible by the widespread adoption of technological advancements.234
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Either way, a lower-tier patent system can help. It would afford
protection geared toward the capacities of local innovators (and
potential innovators) in the South and would create incentives for them
to provide the education and make the adaptations required for
successful diffusion. As locals begin to work in sectors of greater
technological complexity, they would learn to convert proof of concept
to product, develop communication styles and management techniques,
and develop the ability to assess the risks and benefits of entering
particular fields.235 Over time, the manufacturing skills and scientific
and technological knowledge acquired would also have the potential to
enable domestic entrepreneurs to introduce evermore substantive
innovations. They may also discover niches where latecomers enjoy
special advantages and target those industries. These steps would, in
turn, nurture the creative community and produce the ecosystem that
is key to technological self-sufficiency. But because so much of this is
dependent on the availability of technology that already exists in the
North, breaking the novelty trap is a crucial element if a second-tier
regime is to be successful.
V. CONSISTENCY WITH INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
OBLIGATIONS
For the most part, this Article’s proposals are compatible with
international law. The TRIPS Agreement requires that “patents shall
be available for any inventions, whether products or processes, in all
fields of technology, provided that they are new, involve an inventive
step and are capable of industrial application” and allows members to
“implement more extensive protection in their law than is required by
this Agreement, provided that such protection does not contravene the
provisions of [the] Agreement.”236 Thus, adding a second-tier regime
would not in and of itself constitute a violation of TRIPS commitments.
Indeed, the Paris Convention, which is incorporated by reference into
the TRIPS Agreement, specifically mentions “utility models.”237
Furthermore, other than to say that “inventive step” is synonymous
with “non-obvious,”238 none of the relevant terms is defined by the
TRIPS Agreement. States therefore enjoy substantial flexibility in how
235.
Calestous Juma, Karen Fang, Derya Honca, Jorge Huete-Perez, Victor Konde & Sung
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they structure their systems.239 Finally, there is nothing in the TRIPS
Agreement that deals with pricing or limits the ability of WTO members
to impose price controls.240
There are, however, three somewhat difficult issues. The first
concerns the key recommendation for breaking the novelty trap, which
is to exclude from the landscape of prior art inventions that are not
locally patented—or even inventions that are not locally practiced. The
TRIPS Agreement requires that “patents shall be available and patent
rights enjoyable without discrimination as to the place of invention, the
field of technology and whether products are imported or locally
produced.”241 It further requires that “each Member shall accord to the
nationals of other Members treatment no less favorable than that it
accords to its nationals about the protection of intellectual property.”242
Arguably, these provisions mean that foreign patent holders must be
permitted to enjoy the right to prevent local inventors from acquiring
protection over the same, or incrementally altered—or as patent
lawyers say, patentably indistinct—advances. That is, the reference in
TRIPS to the enjoyment of patent rights could be understood to include
the right to block others from obtaining protection on incremental
improvements.243
It is not, however, clear that TRIPS guarantees were meant to
cover anything more than the right to exclude others from practicing a
patented invention.244 Specifically, there is little to indicate that the
TRIPS language should be understood as requiring states to recognize
a right by one inventor to bar others from obtaining protection on
related contributions. As noted above, there was a time when the
United States regarded foreign knowledge and patent applications
differently from US knowledge and patent applications.245 Its trading
partners objected to the practice because they saw it as depriving
foreign inventors of opportunities to exploit and further develop their
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inventions in the United States.246 Significantly, however, they did not
challenge this practice in the WTO. Given that precedent, it would be
difficult to argue that a second-tier system that relies on a relative
novelty standard violates the TRIPS Agreement.
The proposed diffusion patent system is also different from the
one US trading partners objected to in that a foreign utility patent
holder could avert the creation of a separate right by engaging in
diffusion activities itself. Moreover, if a foreign inventor has obtained a
local patent, but the country nonetheless awarded a diffusion patent,
the former patent would most likely block the use of the latter. The
holder of the patent on the original advance could then either agree to
license it or earn whatever royalties are set in connection with a
compulsory license. Notably, the TRIPS Agreement specifically
contemplates the possibility of blocking patents and allows countries to
issue compulsory licenses to deal with them.247 To put this another way,
TRIPS can arguably be understood as recognizing that patent rights do
not extend to blocking improvements and that later inventors might
diminish some of the opportunities otherwise available to earlier
innovators.
But the compulsory license alternative suggests another
problem. To a considerable extent, the diffusion patent system is
designed to put pressure on the original utility patentee to exploit the
invention itself. That is not very different from the way the local
working requirement in the Paris Convention is meant to operate.248
That provision has been the source of considerable controversy precisely
because it limits the choices that patentees can make.249 It has been
repeatedly amended to make it more difficult to invoke.250 And it
currently includes waiting periods that are not a principal part of our
recommendations.251 In addition, there are questions as to whether the
local working provision was voided sub silentio by the TRIPS
Agreement’s ban on discriminating between imported and locally
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produced inventions.252 Nonetheless, we believe that the differences
between a local working requirement and a diffusion patent are
significant enough for the proposal to survive a TRIPS challenge.
Among other things, the diffusion patent recognizes that simply
working an invention is not sufficient to diffuse it or to build a local
creative community. Rather, it requires intellectual contributions to
adapt it to local conditions and to create markets for the product.
The third problem is more serious. Limiting diffusion patents to
local
inventors
conflicts
with
the
national
treatment
guarantee—that is, with the obligation to accord to nationals of every
WTO member “treatment no less favourable” to that which the member
accords to its own nationals.253 To avoid a violation, the class of
beneficiaries could be broadened. It could be structured to include
anyone willing to operate locally. But as we suggested, that practice
could easily crowd out locals.254 The same benefits might be achieved
for diffusing the invention, but the protection is likely to be less effective
at fostering domestic creativity. Thus, it may do little to promote
technological self-sufficiency.
Another approach is to broaden the class of potential
beneficiaries to include nationals in similarly situated developing
countries. Even better would be to create a unitary system that
protected and encouraged diffusion activities in multiple countries in
the South. That would increase the pool of mid-level inventors who
would be interested in undertaking local diffusion. And the larger
market would enhance the available incentives. More important for
TRIPS, if the beneficiaries are defined by economic status, other
countries could not claim de jure discrimination.255
252.
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Other countries might, however, argue that such a system
discriminates de facto: they might claim that status is simply a proxy
for nationality.256 As the WTO panel decision in the EC-GI dispute
made clear, de facto discrimination can also be actionable.257 That case
involved an EU Regulation that set out one procedure for acquiring
geographical indications for foods produced in the European Union and
another (more onerous) procedure for foods made elsewhere.258
Although the Regulation did not expressly discriminate among WTO
countries, the Panel held the distinctions between the place of
production did not “occur as a random outcome in a particular case but
as a feature of the design and structure of the system,” and the system
would “operate in practice” to discriminate “to the detriment” of the
nationals of countries that are not in the European Union.259 The Panel
then held that to permit members to substitute the place of production
for nationality would undermine an important feature of the WTO
framework agreements: the guarantee that right holders would enjoy
“effective equality of opportunities” to trade in WTO markets.260 To be
sure, there are differences between the Regulation at issue in EC-GI
and a law that treats inventors from developing countries in a special
way. However, substituting economic indicators for nationality has
essentially the same effect. Indeed, limiting the diffusion patent regime
to nationals of similarly situated countries is intended as a form of
protectionism: its goal is to enhance domestic technological proficiency
by sheltering locals from being crowded out by foreigners.
It is, however, worth noting that it is not clear that the national
treatment obligation has ever been faithfully honored in the patenting
realm. In a series of studies of patent office actions in the IP5 (the
USPTO, the Japanese Patent Office, the European Patent Office, the
National Intellectual Property Administration of the People’s Republic
of China, and Korean Intellectual Property Office), Beth Webster and
her coauthors observed systematic bias against foreign inventors.261
Although the authors found that the bias is reduced when inventors
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rely on local prosecution attorneys, it does not disappear.262 The PCT
can even exacerbate the effect because it too creates a bias in favor of
local applicants.263 Indeed, in Kumar’s close study of patenting in the
Tiger economies, he found that until Japan developed technological
capacities on par with developed economies, patent applications by
foreigners experienced longer pendency periods in the patent office
relative to domestic applications (and, since the term begins on the
filing date, therefore enjoyed shorter terms of protection).264 The claims
that were eventually issued also tended to be narrower than claims in
the patents of domestic inventors.265 Similarly, Korea tolerated lax
enforcement (and multiple complaints from the United States) to
facilitate duplicative imitation.266 In his report to the OECD, Kumar
concluded that the TRIPS Agreement should be revised to give
developing countries more flexibility until they reach a specified per
capita income.267
A strong argument can be made that even without amending the
Agreement, this flexibility is available. While it is true that the
transition provisions included in TRIPS (some of which have been
extended several times) do not apply to national treatment
obligations,268 WTO law should be construed to give developing
countries room to maneuver with respect to issues involving
development. For example, Simon Klopschinski, Christopher S. Gibson,
and Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan have suggested that the national
treatment obligation in TRIPS should be interpreted in light of its
analog in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).269 The
relevant GATT provision requires nondiscrimination among products of
262.
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different national origins. Notably, it applies only to like products.270
Accordingly, WTO members can distinguish among products that are
different in ways that further their own national policies. TRIPS
focuses on the nationality of right holders rather than products.271 True,
it does not include the comparator “like.”272 But interpolating a
comparison into the Agreement that permits countries to distinguish
among inventors of different nationalities is consistent with WTO goals
and values.273 TRIPS would then recognize that inventors from
different countries are in very different positions from one another and
that affording them effective equality of opportunities requires nations
to make distinctions to enable their inventors to compete. Significantly,
Thomas Cottier, a member of the Swiss delegation during the
negotiation of the TRIPS Agreement, has argued that the objectives and
principles articulated by the TRIPS Agreement, which explicitly refer
to “the promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and
dissemination of technology in a manner conducive to social and
economic welfare,” requires that the Agreement be interpreted in a
manner conducive to technological development.274
A softer view of national treatment also accords with
recommendations that UNCTAD made when WIPO first considered the
idea of harmonizing IP laws more thoroughly.275 In its view:
“[E]quality of treatment only makes sense when the parties involved are in a
general way equal; when they are not, equality of treatment simply gives the
stronger party unlimited freedom to utilize his power at the expense of the weaker
party.”276

Writing in 1975, UNCTAD was concerned that harmonization
would create a “reverse system of preferences” that would favor highly
developed countries and impose heavy costs on other nations.277
270.
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Subsequent events have shown UNCTAD to be prescient.278 As noted in
the introduction, technological inequality has persisted under TRIPS,
and the sequelae of the COVID-19 pandemic demonstrate its tragic
consequences.279 UNCTAD advocated for an international system that
allowed for national differences designed to promote technological
development.280 Although TRIPS may represent more harmonization
than UNCTAD considered wise,281 it is a minimum standards
agreement, and the commitment to flexibility should permeate the
interpretation of all its provisions, including the ones on
nondiscrimination.282 Furthermore, although the WTO does not
generally make normative judgments concerning the regulatory
purpose of challenged legislation,283 a strong argument can be made
that the catastrophic consequences of technological dependency require
the WTO to take into account the need of all countries to grow their
technological sectors.284
VI. CONCLUSION
The inadequacy of the global response to COVID-19 has exposed
a deep flaw in the international intellectual property system. By raising
costs and impeding technological development in the Global South, the
TRIPS Agreement has left many countries incapable of developing,
manufacturing, and distributing innovations that are crucial to
survival. Changing intellectual property law will, of course, not cure the
problem. Technological dependency has many root causes, including the
absence of a trained workforce and an appreciation for the value of
acquiring human capital; the paucity of venture capitalists,
entrepreneurs, and lawyers; deficiencies in infrastructure, such as the
absence of laboratories, roads, and refrigeration; governance problems;
and inadequate institutions to support education, capital accumulation,
and risk-taking. But it is important to remember that these factors are
interdependent: a country needs a research base to create incentives to
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adopt a strong patent system.285 It needs a patent system to attract
venture capitalists, high-tech jobs to make it worth acquiring human
capital, and seekers of education to promote the need for universities.
Thus, while modifications to the intellectual property system are not a
cure, reform can be an important step.
A fundamental question is how that step ought to be designed.
In this Article, we discuss one way in which intellectual property law
has interfered with development: the structure of patent law has
trapped novel advances in a legal limbo that makes it difficult for
less developed countries to enjoy high-tech products, reach the
technological frontier, or even attain technological self-sufficiency in
areas of critical importance, such as health care. Accordingly, we have
offered various approaches to breaking that trap.
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